Passing the buck without the bucks- some reflections on fiscal decentralisation and the business rate retention strategy in England by Greenhalgh, Paul & Muldoon-Smith, Kevin
PASSING THE BUCK WITHOUT THE 
BUCKS – SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND THE 
BUSINESS RATE RETENTION 
STRATEGY IN ENGLAND 
 
THE TERRIER - SUMMER 2015 
 
Kevin Muldoon-Smith and Dr Paul Greenhalgh 
 
Kevin is a regeneration professional, having previously worked for a variety of public sector organisations, specialising in 
physical, economic and social regeneration. He has managed various commercial property portfolios. He is currently a Post 
Graduate Researcher at Northumbria University, recruited to investigate the incidence, impact and options available to 
address office vacancy in town and city centres in the UK. 
kevin.muldoon-smith@northumbria.ac.uk 
 
Paul is a Reader in Property Economics and founding member of the URBaNE research group at Northumbria University. 
He has published extensively in the field of urban land economics with a particular focus on evaluating the impact of 
property-led urban regeneration. He is a member of the RICS Planning and Development, Valuation and Commercial 
Property Professional Groups. He is also a member of the Regional Studies Association, Fellow of the Higher Education 
Academy, and ACES. paul.greenhalgh@northumbria.ac.uk  
 
Kevin and Paul reflect on the intricacies and potential impacts of the government’s drive toward fiscal 
decentralisation and independence. They focus on the government’s Business Rate Retention Strategy (BRRS) 
and its consequences for local authorities in contrasting locations. 
 
Introduction 
The current hyperbole associated with devolution in England intimates that enhanced territorial governance and 
localism is bound up with, and dependent on, fiscal decentralisation. The current emphasis on the ‘Northern 
Powerhouse’ and the entrepreneurial Devo-Manc would have us believe that a degree of locational 
independence will be the catalyst for economic resilience and the impetus for spatial rebalancing throughout 
England. Indeed, it is hardly possible to pick up a government policy document or city future think-piece without 
finding some reference to more localised power and control of local finance. Timely research by Northumbria 
University offers a perspective in relation to this situation, in particular the potential impact of the government’s 
Business Rate Retention Strategy (BRRS) which was introduced in 2013. The central policy drivers for the 
strategy are localism and economic growth, totems that will receive even more emphasis as local authorities are 
increasingly expected to stand on their own 2 feet amidst more swingeing public sector cuts and fiscal prudence. 
Yet, due to its arcane workings, the new system has received relatively little attention (next to the slightly better 
known Tax Increment Financing, New Development Deals and Enterprise Zones) which has let it fly under the 
radar with little scrutiny. [Ed – see Roger Messenger’s article in 2014/15 Terrier]. 
 
The economics of Business Rate Retention 
Without question the belated English interest in devolution presents a rare opportunity for new ways of working. 
Yet, our findings suggest that the current arguments in favour of fiscal decentralisation and spatial rebalancing 
are hollow words when distilled against the variegated economic geography in England. Rather than ameliorating 
spatial inequality, the BRRS potentially exacerbates uneven development. Our findings suggest that the 
centralised national economy could be replaced by an equally divisive city based one where a minority of 
locations are dealt all of the aces while the rest get a raw deal. Indeed, the former leader of Newcastle City 
Council, Lord Jeremy Beecham, argues that the BRRS could result in a case of ‘Passing the buck, without the 
bucks.’ (Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 28th March 2015). The BRRS replaced the centrally determined formula 
grant funding mechanism for local authorities. The new strategy allows local areas to retain 50% of business rate 
income and an additional 50% of any new business rate income (Manchester has recently been awarded 100% 
retention privileges by George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Secretary of State). The 
model is clearly complex (perhaps its main weakness). However for the purpose of this article, attention is paid to 
the incentive effect and the adjustments for national rating revaluation. The incentive effect means that local 
authorities in England are encouraged to increase the size of their business rate base in order to create revenue 
to pay for local service provision, economic development and urban regeneration. However, the adjustment for 
revaluation that takes place every 5 years strips out any increase in urban growth (through the adjustments in the 
top up and tariff mechanism); the only growth that remains is that associated with net new floor space, either 
derived from new build construction or repurposed floor space. The critical point, therefore, is that the relative 
increase in rental values of existing properties cannot be capitalised. This means that the success or failure of the 
BRRS incentive mechanism is bound up with the economics of commercial real estate development, which is 
spatially selective. However, in the absence of central government grant, all local authorities are expected to 
create investment in new commercial real estate in order to underwrite the funding of public services and urban 
regeneration. 
 
Dealing with an uneven hand 
Our central finding is that the BRRS is not driven by a desire to tackle inequality or to narrow the gap between 
rich and poor. Rather, the strategy is founded upon the ability to create new floor space through new build 
construction or conversion of existing floor space. To reaffirm our position, there are traditionally 2 methods of 
extracting value from the built environment in order to generate ‘growth’ (new money) in urban finance. The first 
involves building new properties in order to create ‘new’ business rate yield. The second involves investment in 
current property stock and its surrounding area in order to increase its inherent value. In England, in the majority 
of circumstances, the latter method is unrewarded, quite literally devaluing the exiting built environment. This 
means that the minority of locations where market conditions are conducive to new development, those with 
buoyant rental market structures have a distinct advantage over the rest. We have developed a broad typology of 
locations in England to illustrate this situation, namely ‘premium locations’, ‘stranded locations’, and ‘redundant 
locations.’ The formulation of the simple typology is based upon the potential ability of local authorities to 
capitalise their urban assets into the BRRS model of urban finance. 
 
Premium locations 
Premium locations are most adept at exploiting and actualising the twin BRRS policy objectives of ‘localism’ and 
‘growth.’ Capitalising on buoyant property market characteristics, such locations are relatively autonomous 
because they are able to leverage the more or less guaranteed ability to promote new floor space creation. 
Investment yields in these locations create attractive propositions for global property investors who view property 
as a long term investment medium. This gives premium locations an automatic advantage over other areas 
because it is these institutional investors and global investment capital that determine, when, where and how 
commercial floor space is developed. These locations have the inherent ability to exploit and strategise their real 
estate development, creating and securitising growth, and in turn, linking into international circuits of capital and 
financialisation. This is because commercial real estate in such locations is more liquid and fungible and can be 
repackaged into alternative financialised products and traded on the capital markets. In England, these locations 
are typically few, a consequence of their relative size, and include the central London boroughs, the ‘core cities’ 
of Birmingham, Bristol, Nottingham, Sheffield, Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle (and their cousins over the 
border Edinburgh and Glasgow) and increasingly the ‘Metros’ (which include Reading, Oxford and Cambridge). 
 
Stranded locations 
Stranded locations have relatively buoyant business rate portfolios in terms of quantity but find it difficult to utilise 
the BRRS growth incentive. The current formulation of the BRRS, particularly the ‘stripping out procedure,’ 
hinders these locations from achieving their full economic potential. This can be because of the historical nature 
of the built environment (think Liverpool, Bath and Durham), restrictions in the availability of space to build new 
properties, or more simply, a general satisfaction with the current composition of commercial real estate in such 
locations. Local authorities like Westminster Council, the holder of one of the most valuable business rate 
portfolios in England, argues that its hands are tied because it cannot maximise the income from all of its 
property assets for growth (a consequence of restrained expansion space and the lack of appetite for 
redevelopment or conversion). Westminster LBC should not see any decline in tax relative to its baseline funding 
level (dependent on the accuracy of the baseline assessment) however the authority will not be able to manage 
its existing assets in order to generate any new growth because of the primacy given to new floor space 
construction. 
 
Redundant locations 
Redundant locations are disadvantaged because of their inferior property market characteristics. Such locations 
have either marginal or negative development values and cannot generate high enough rental levels to justify the 
costs of new development. Concurrently, these locations may also be shrinking due to economic change and 
demographic adjustment. Redundant locations are typically associated with older, secondary property markets 
which exhibit depressed rental levels and low levels of occupier demand. Institutional investors will not provide 
finance for development in these locations because they are unprofitable and do not conform to the conventions 
of commercial real estate development. It is problematic for these locations to exploit the BRRS as they do not 
have the underlying growth potential or critical business rate mass to pay for public services. These locations are 
typically situated in the north, such as Teesside, Humberside, Grimsby, Scunthorpe, Bury, Oldham, Crewe and 
the Black Country, indicating that it is often the small towns and cities that suffer urban decline rather than the big 
cities. Simply put, it is a little churlish to devolve power (and blame) to locations that cannot wield it. 
 
Concluding remarks 
How will those local authorities that cannot demonstrate economically viable commercial real estate development 
fund their future public welfare needs? Which type of local authority do you work for? Are you lucky enough to be 
in a premium location? Are you frustrated in a stranded location? Or are you struggling to deal with inferior 
economic conditions in a redundant location? We predict that a key challenge in the future for local government 
officers (on top of the complexity involved in administering the system) will be retaining the correct balance and 
mix of employment sites and premises amid pressure to expand local business rate portfolios. Hence, in the 
future, an underlying question for local government asset managers could be: are you faced with a situation 
where you are promoting new commercial development to fund public sector services rather than the needs of 
economic demand? How can local government officers make sure that the pack of cards is stacked evenly? 
There is no easy answer! However, we propose a number of considerations: First, it is not appropriate to 
introduce new urban finance processes without them being subject to some kind of practitioner and intellectual 
oversight. The speed with which fiscal decentralisation (and its associated tools of urban finance) is taking place 
makes it imperative to understand its implications for the funding of welfare provision, economic development and 
urban regeneration. It is therefore important empirically to monitor, evaluate and review new tools of urban 
finance in order to expose the uneven geographical distribution, impact and consequences of fiscal 
decentralisation and contemporary methods of urban finance. Second, there is considerable tension between the 
notion of fiscal devolution and equal redistribution and how both concepts might be reconciled. This is because 
business rate retention, in certain locations, is about the amount of money coming into a location, rather than 
what could be generated in that location, a consequence of the variability in geographical tax base in terms of 
quantity and the concomitant ability for that tax base to expand. Third, amidst the clamour for more local power 
there must also be an engagement with the textures of locally specific commercial real estate markets and the 
professionals who understand them best. This is because our analysis of the BRRS in England proves that fiscal 
decentralisation is bound up with the relative structures of locally specific commercial real estate markets (and 
therefore the professional expertise of ACES members) and the interlinked ability to both attract and justify 
investment in commercial real estate development. This work forms part of an ongoing research project and 
consultation service (R3intelligence, Department of Architecture and Built Environment at Northumbria 
University). In order to monitor the Business Rate Retention Strategy we have recently developed a multi criteria 
commercial real estate model for every local authority location in England and Wales. The intelligent model can 
be programmed to appraise any geographical scale from the local street, to the economic strategy zone, to the 
local authority boundary, pooled area or functional economic territory. 
 
